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VICE, BLAMEWORTHINESS AND CULTURAL IGNORANCE 
Elinor Mason and Alan T. Wilson 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Widespread cultural ignorance has seemed to many to be exculpatory. It seems that ancient 
slaveholders, 1950s sexists, and, more controversially, present day meat eaters, are morally 
ignorant – they do not know that what they are doing is wrong.1 Perhaps these agents are 
ignorant in a way that does not reflect badly on them. Something about the situation where 
ignorance is widespread seems to indicate that their ignorance is not culpable.  
 
In this paper we argue that ignorance can be culpable even in a situation of widespread cultural 
ignorance. However, it is not usually culpable through a previous self-conscious act of 
wrongdoing.2 We argue that ignorance can be culpable if the ignorance results from a flawed will, 
and we argue that understanding a flawed will in terms of a vice is very useful here. In particular, 
moral ignorance3 often results from the exercise of a moral-epistemic vice, and this renders 
subsequent acts blameworthy, even when the ignorance is widespread.  
 
1. IGNORANCE AND BLAMEWORTHINESS 
Ignorance is a prime example of a factor that can render an agent blameless for an otherwise 
problematic action. For example, if we see Brian pouring poison into his partner’s cup of tea, we 
are likely to blame Brian for performing this action. However, if we later learn that Brian was 
ignorant of some relevant fact (he thought the poison was milk, for example) then we will realise 
that blame may not be appropriate on this occasion. As Strawson says, ignorance is a 
paradigmatic excuse. Strawson distinguishes between two groups of considerations that count as 
excuses: those that apply to an act, and those that apply to agents. In his account of the first 
group, Strawson says: 
 
To the first group belong all those which might give occasion for the employment of 
such expressions as ‘He didn’t mean to’, ‘He hadn’t realized’, ‘He didn’t know’… 
They do not suggest that the agent is any way an inappropriate object of that kind of 
demand for goodwill or regard which is reflected in our ordinary reactive attitudes. 
They suggest instead that the fact of injury was not in this case incompatible with 
that demand’s being fulfilled, that the fact of injury was quite consistent with the 
agent’s attitude and intentions being just what we demand they should be.4 
 
                                                          
1 The first two examples have been discussed in the literature. See Moody-Adams (1994) and Rosen (2003). 
2 Holly Smith (1983) calls these tracing cases. Some writers (not Smith herself) have argued that this is the only 
way that ignorance can be culpable. See Rosen (2003, 2004, 2008); Zimmerman (1997, 2008); and Levy (2011). 
3 Of course, it can be difficult to determine what counts as moral ignorance. It is hard to draw the line between 
what is moral and what is factual. Is the belief that some races are less intelligent than others a moral or a 
factual mistake? We will use a wide definition of normative ignorance, erring on the side of including possibly 
factual beliefs. 
4 Strawson (1962), as reprinted in Watson (ed.) (2003) pp. 77-78. 
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If Brian was ignorant of the fact that he was pouring poison into the tea, then we do not have 
any definite reason to suppose that his action demonstrates a lack of good will. However, it is 
possible to add to the example so that we should once again be suspicious of Brian. Suppose 
several signs had been placed in the kitchen warning users that all of the milk had been replaced 
with poison, and that the container from which Brian poured was clearly marked ‘POISON’. 
Suppose also that Brian stands to inherit a lot of money if his partner dies, and that their 
relationship has been painfully awful for years. Further, suppose that Brian glances at the signs 
and looks away immediately, telling himself that there is no reason for him to read them.  When 
the example is fleshed out in this way, it once again becomes intuitive to suppose that Brian is 
blameworthy for his action – his ignorance is affected, or motivated. 
 
Michele Moody-Adams has argued that cultural ignorance is often a bit like this.5 It is not entirely 
clear how we should characterise affected ignorance, but we can accept that people do 
sometimes render themselves ignorant, and that when they do this, they have a flawed will and 
are blameworthy. Imagine the editor of a tabloid newspaper, who says to her reporters, ‘I want 
to know what Celebrity X gets up to, who she talks to, who she sees and who she sleeps with – 
get me something no other newspaper has published’. In such a case the boss may, quite 
deliberately, avoid any conversation with her employees about the methods they have used, and 
indeed, curtail any encounter where she may be forced to confront direct evidence that her 
employees are hacking cell phones. In such a case it is of course tendentious to claim that the 
editor is genuinely ignorant. She might argue later in court, ‘I don’t even know how to hack 
phones, I don’t know where my employees would have found out, I don’t know how much it 
would cost, or how they could have afforded it on their salaries and still made it worthwhile!’. 
There are, of course, a lot of things the editor genuinely didn’t know, but it seems very unlikely 
that she did not know, at some level, that phones were being hacked.6 The editor seems 
blameworthy. 
 
In this case it is not clear that the ignorance is genuine. Insofar as it is genuine, it stems from 
previous culpable acts: the editor knew that she might find out something unpleasant if she did 
certain things, and so in that knowledge she avoided those actions. Moody-Adams argues that our 
relationship to the available evidence in our own culture may be similarly suspect, though in the 
case of widespread cultural ignorance the situation is obviously more complex. Moody-Adams 
argues that culture is not an alien and monolithic force.  There can be cracks in the edifice, and 
this is how change happens. All cultural belief systems are perpetuated and re-shaped by the 
actions and expectations of individuals. She stresses that a culture is not an agent, only people are 
agents, and they are not necessarily blinded by their culture. Thus, in many cases, people can be 
culpable; they willingly and (implicitly) knowingly engage in their cultural vices, and they could 
do otherwise. Moody-Adams discusses the case of Ancient Greek slaveholders, who, she argues, 
knew (at some level) that slavery was wrong, but continued with it because it served their 
interests. 
 
It is possible that some cultural ignorance is motivated ignorance in one of these senses. If that is 
right, then there is no difficulty in seeing that it is blameworthy. Either the so-called ignorance is 
                                                          
5 See Moody Adams (1994 and 1997). 
6 This is structurally similar to Moody-Adams’ example (1994) p. 301. 
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not really ignorance at all, but a complex state of denial such that the agent knows at some level 
that her acts are morally problematic or, the ignorance is brought about by a culpable process. 
The paradigmatic cases of culpable ignorance come about through self-consciously wrong acts, 
but arguably, ignorance can also be culpable when it is brought about by negligence, carelessness 
and so on. Ignorance is often motivated – I don’t want to know how messy the kitchen is, so I 
don’t go in there. But it may be that I avoid the kitchen semi-consciously, or unconsciously, 
rather than consciously. Most cases of moral ignorance are cases where the ignorance has come 
about without any conscious act. Yet, we will argue, moral ignorance can be culpable in those 
cases too. 
 
The idea that one can be morally culpable without a self-conscious action is familiar in recent 
literature on moral responsibility. For example, Nomy Arpaly argues that, in general, moral self-
awareness is not required for moral worth.7 Arpaly argues, using the case of Huck Finn, that 
what makes someone praiseworthy is not that they are motivated by doing the right thing in the 
de dicto sense. On Arpaly’s account, praiseworthiness depends on being motivated directly by the 
reasons that make a choice the morally right one, i.e. being motivated by moral value de re, not de 
dicto. Huck is responsive to actual moral reasons. He ‘feels’ (at some level) that Jim is a person, 
that Jim’s liberty matters, and that he should help Jim.8 Huck is motivated by these things, even 
though he cannot express them, and, indeed, could not be said to know them at all. This is why 
Huck is praiseworthy for his act of helping Jim. Huck’s ignorance of the moral facts is irrelevant.  
 
Arpaly’s point is that moral worth is independent of a conscious grasp of moral status. Arpaly’s 
view is representative of a school of thought, often called the ‘Attributability view’, or 
‘Attributionism’, that locates moral responsibility in an agent’s deep evaluative attitudes, rather 
than what she does in a self-aware way.9 When people act wrongly without knowing that what 
they are doing is wrong they are not usually motivated by badness itself.  They are usually 
motivated by something that is not itself bad (love, money, fame) or they are overwhelmed by 
motives that, while not admirable, do not constitute direct de re motivation to the bad (greed, 
fear, passion). Angela Smith uses an example of someone forgetting their friend’s birthday.10 It is 
not that she has really bad motivations, it is just that she does not care enough about her friend – 
something is revealed in her action that she herself is not aware of. Her action reveals a flawed 
will. 
 
Our argument here is broadly sympathetic to an attributability view, but we are making a 
different point. Even if Arpaly, Smith and others are right that there are cases where an agent 
manifests a flawed will though she is not consciously acting wrongly, there are other cases where 
                                                          
7 Arpaly (2003). See also Arpaly and Schroeder (1999) and their more recent work. 
8 Arpaly is of course talking about Mark Twain’s novel, in which a young White boy, raised in a racist society, 
who does not consciously reject the racist orthodoxy, helps a Black slave to escape. See Ibid. Chapter 3. 
9 See Angela Smith (2005) for a useful discussion of the difference between volitionist and attributionist views. 
See Watson (1996) for one of the first defences of the attributability view. More recently, T.M. Scanlon (1998, 
2008); Nomi Arpaly (2003, 2006); Angela Smith (2005, 2008); Hieronymi (2008); Sher (2009); and Shoemaker 
(2015) have all developed versions of an attributability view. Matthew Talbert has deployed such a view in 
discussions of the ancient slaveholders (2013). 
10 Angela Smith (2005) p.236 
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that is not so clear.11  We are interested in the tricky cases where ignorance does, at least prima 
facie, seem to have the effect of undermining the claim that the agent’s will is flawed. Important 
cases of cultural ignorance may involve bad acts that do not, in themselves, indicate poor quality 
of will. Take the 1952 American father, who educates his sons but not his daughter. He loves his 
daughter, and he wants nothing but good for her, he just has a mistaken view about her 
capabilities and rights.  
 
The case of the 1952 American father is thus not like the cases that Attributionists focus on. His 
failure is not a failure of motivation at the time of action, in the way that the friend who forgets a 
birthday exhibits a failure of motivation. The father is not motivated de re to the bad, and nor is 
he insufficiently motived by his daughter’s happiness (we can suppose). Rather, he has made a 
prior error. If that is right, then the crucial question is whether his prior error, in accepting that 
women are fitted for very different roles in life than men, is itself culpable. Our argument is that 
the way in which agents become ignorant can, in some cases, be indicative of a flawed will. In 
Holly Smith’s terminology, we are arguing that widespread cultural ignorance can be seen as a 
tracing case. It can be traced back to a moral-epistemic vice.12 
 
2. VIRTUES AND VICES 
Virtues and vices, at least in the sense that we are interested in here, are character traits. As a 
starting point, this is fairly uncontroversial as far as discussion of the moral virtues is concerned, 
but it may meet with some resistance from a sub-set of those working on the epistemic (or 
intellectual) virtues. Some ‘reliabilist’ virtue epistemologists have been willing to apply the term 
intellectual virtue to any feature of an agent that reliably leads to epistemically valuable ends such 
as truth or knowledge. This approach results in the acceptance of the virtue status of abilities like 
reliable eyesight or a good memory.13 It is not our intention to argue directly against this 
alternative usage of the term virtue. Rather, it is worth mentioning in order to set it aside and to 
make clear that, for our purposes, being a character trait is a necessary condition for being a 
virtue or a vice. 
 
A distinction can be made between different ways of understanding how we decide which traits 
are virtues and which are vices. As Jason Baehr puts it, this distinction is between “competence” 
conceptions of the virtues and “personal worth” conceptions.14 On the competence conception, 
a virtue is a character trait that reliably helps to bring about some valuable end, while a vice is a 
character trait that reliably impedes or hinders the pursuit of that end. On the personal worth 
conception, virtues and vices are more intimately related to the agent’s character in the sense that 
they involve the agent being motivated in a certain way. On what we can call a ‘pure’ form of the 
                                                          
11 Matt King (2009) argues that many of the cases that attributionists themselves use are ambiguous – 
sometimes an unfortunate act reflects nothing about an agent’s character or deep motivations.  Holly Smith 
(2011) argues that agents are blameworthy for acts done in ignorance only if a sufficient amount of their 
psychology is behind the bad act.  
12 As Smith points out (1983), in cases of culpable ignorance the benighting act has bad motives, but the acts 
done in ignorance need not themselves involve bad motivations. If not, then the blameworthiness of later acts 
is just inherited. Here we are focussing on this sort of culpable ignorance, where blameworthiness of later acts 
can be inherited. 
13 See, for example, Greco (2002). For a survey of the debate in epistemology see Baehr (2006). 
14 See Baehr (2007) p. 464. This distinction maps on to the generally accepted distinction between reliabilists 
and responsibilists in virtue epistemology. See also Battaly (2014).  
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personal worth conception, the motivation is sufficient for virtue, whereas on a ‘mixed’ version it 
is possible to demand some level of reliability in addition to the admirable motivation. Some 
examples of virtue theorists may help to make this clearer. In the moral realm, Julia Driver 
adheres to the competence conception, arguing that moral virtues are character traits that reliably 
bring about good outcomes.15 Michael Slote accepts a pure form of the personal worth 
conception, believing that admirable motives are sufficient for virtue.16 In the epistemic realm, 
Linda Zagzebski takes a mixed view, arguing that virtues involve both admirable motives and a 
sufficient level of reliability, whereas the reliabilists, such as John Greco, defend forms of the 
competence conception.17 More recently, Quassim Cassam has argued in favour of the 
competence approach in relation to epistemic vices.18 
 
It is important to point out that pluralism is an option here. Perhaps there is more than one form 
of virtue (and vice) and the different conceptions simply capture different forms. This is the 
point that Baehr is aiming to make when explaining the distinction in the first place.19 And so, 
while we’ll be focusing on a personal worth understanding of the virtues and vices in this paper, 
this does not necessarily commit us to arguing that the competence conception is completely 
misguided.  
 
On our view, a virtue is a character trait and being virtuous involves an agent’s motivations: we 
can expect a virtuous agent to be motivated in certain ways and in response to certain 
considerations. Virtuous agents have a good will in the sense that their motivations are 
admirable. One way in which a motivation can be admirable or virtuous is if it has a valuable 
target. For example, if we accept that the protection and promotion of well-being is valuable 
then we will be inclined to think that a motivation towards this can be virtuous. However, a 
valuable target is, plausibly, not enough. The motivation must also have certain features. Firstly, 
an agent’s motivation to promote well-being will not be sufficient for virtue if it is sporadic or 
fleeting. Instead, an admirable motivation must be sufficiently persistent. Furthermore, any 
motivation that counts as a virtue must be sufficiently strongly felt. That is, the motivation must 
not be so weak that, even if persistent, it would never be strong enough to actually prompt an 
agent into action. And thirdly, the motivation must be sufficiently robust in the sense that it will 
not be easily overridden by competing considerations. If an agent possesses a persistent and 
strongly felt motivation to promote well-being, but this motivation is always overridden by their 
competing aim of making as much money as possible, then we will not want to say that their 
motivation is sufficient for virtue. It is only when sufficient levels of persistence, strength and 
robustness are achieved that an agent’s motivation will be sufficient for the status of virtue.20 For 
ease of use, we can refer to a motivation that meets the sufficient levels of persistence, strength 
                                                          
15 Driver (2001) 
16 Slote (2001) 
17 Zagzebski (1996) and Greco (2002) (As mentioned earlier, Greco does not stipulate that virtues must be 
character traits.) 
18 Cassam (forthcoming) 
19 Baehr (2007) pp. 464-465 
20 Our interest here is in what is required for a motivational trait to count as a virtue. Motivations that lack the 
necessary features may yet be referred to as “virtuous” in the loose sense that actions or outcomes or people 
may also be referred to as virtuous. But they will not be virtues as long as they lack the sufficient levels of 
persistence, strength and robustness. 
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and robustness as a deep motivation. On our personal worth conception, a virtue will necessarily 
involve a deep motivation towards some valuable end. 
 
What, then, about the nature of vice on this conception? There will be (at least) two different 
ways in which a character trait can be classified as a vice, both of which concern a failure of the 
agent’s good will. Firstly, vice can simply mirror the virtues by being actively directed towards 
bad targets. For example, the vice of sadistic cruelty might be directed towards causing harm to 
others. However, a second (and perhaps more common) possibility is that an agent possesses a 
serious failing in their motivation towards a valuable end. This will involve a problematic failure 
in the depth of the agent’s motivation towards some good. So an agent who constantly passes up 
the opportunity to help others because of some competing motivation may well count as vicious. 
And this can be true even if the competing motivation is towards something which is not in itself 
bad. So an agent who is distracted by the opportunity to further their own interests might not be 
directed towards something that is bad, but the failing in the depth of their motivation towards 
the good still indicates a flawed will.21 Vice, then, involves a motivational failing (in one of two 
ways) while virtue involves the possession of admirable motivations. 
 
With all of this established, it is now possible to address the final taxonomical issue of how to 
distinguish moral virtues and vices from epistemic virtues and vices. And the picture that has 
been set out provides us with the resources to do this in a fairly straightforward manner. Moral 
virtues are those character traits that necessarily involve a deep motivation towards morally 
valuable targets, and the moral vices are those traits that necessarily involve a failure in this kind 
of motivation. Epistemic virtues are those character traits that involve a deep motivation towards 
epistemically valuable targets, epistemic vices are those that involve a failure in this kind of 
motivation. Of course, there is then the further question of which targets are morally and 
epistemically valuable. For now, we can simply use plausible examples of such targets, and leave 
an in-depth investigation of this issue for another time. In order to have examples to work with 
let us say that the protection and promotion of well-being is morally valuable (hence explaining 
the moral virtue status of kindness) and that the achieving of fair outcomes is morally valuable 
(hence explaining the moral virtue status of justice). In the epistemic realm, we can use the idea 
of “cognitive contact with reality” as utilised by Zagzebski, where this includes things such as 
true belief, knowledge, and understanding.22 So, a character trait will be a moral virtue if it 
involves a deep motivation for the promotion of well-being or the achieving of fair outcomes. 
Moral vices involve a failure in motivations of this sort. And a character trait will be an epistemic 
virtue if it involves a deep motivation for cognitive contact with reality. Epistemic vices will 
involve a failure in motivations of this sort. 
 
This way of understanding the nature of moral and epistemic vice leaves open the possibility that 
there can be character traits which straddle the standard distinction between the moral and the 
epistemic. This idea is one that has gained much traction is recent times, especially following 
                                                          
21 It is important to specify here that we are not claiming that lacking virtue is always vicious. There will be 
cases where the agent’s lack of virtue is not a reflection on their character. This will be the case, for example, 
for cognitively impaired agents where the lack of actual virtue does not in any way reflect a failure of the will. 
22 Zagzebski (1996) Part II, Section 4.1 
7 
 
 
 
Miranda Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice.23 Fricker argues that it is possible to possess her 
proposed virtue of testimonial justice as either a moral or an epistemic virtue, or both.24 And 
Fricker is not alone in acknowledging this possibility. For example, Zagzebski argues that all 
epistemic virtues are also moral virtues (because the epistemic is a sub-set of the moral).25 On the 
picture that we have proposed, a trait will be both a moral and an epistemic vice (a moral-
epistemic vice) when it involves a double failing in motivation. For an example, consider the 
following description of George W. Bush, which is discussed by William FitzPatrick: 
 
[A] chief executive who is widely characterised by those involved with him (including 
politically friendly sources) as possessing unusual degrees of both incuriousity and 
certitude. There is a growing body of evidence that this is someone who “values 
loyalty above expertise,” has “a preference for advisers whose personal fortunes are 
almost entirely bound up with his own,” and “likes to surround himself with 
obsequious courtiers,” shutting out or attacking – with the help of those close to him 
– dissenting voices and sources of information that cannot be counted upon to 
support conclusions already held with a confidence bearing little resemblance to the 
available evidence.26 
 
Here we have an agent who is clearly in possession of epistemic vice. We have very good reason 
to suspect that this behaviour is indicative of a failing in the motivation towards the epistemic 
good. However, there is a double failing in motivation here. There is also a failure of kindness 
and justice (that is, a failure of motivation towards both well-being and fairness). We have, then, 
a failing in both the moral and epistemic realms. The incuriousity and dogmatism on display are 
both epistemically and morally vicious, and clearly implicate the agent’s character. This example 
highlights the possibility of traits that demonstrate a lack of motivational concern for both moral 
and epistemic goods, and such traits ought to be categorised as moral-epistemic vices.  
 
On the personal worth conception that we have proposed, the discussion of virtue and vice 
matches closely with the account of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness provided by Arpaly 
(and discussed above). To possess a moral virtue is to be motivated by what is of actual moral 
value (such as the promotion of well-being) and is therefore praiseworthy. To possess a moral 
vice is either to be motivated by what is of moral disvalue (as in the case of sadistic cruelty) or to 
have a motivational failing regarding the moral good, and is therefore blameworthy. Given this, 
exercise of a moral-epistemic vice will also be blameworthy. Vice is blameworthy because it is a 
way of having a flawed will – either being motivated towards the wrong things or being 
insufficiently motivated towards the right things.27 
 
It is worth emphasising that we are not committed to any particular account of what sort of 
blame or how much of it is appropriate when an agent displays a moral-epistemic vice.  As 
                                                          
23 Fricker (2007). See also Medina (2013). 
24 Ibid. pp. 120-123 
25 Zagzebski (1996) Part II, Section 3 
26 FitzPatrick (2008) p. 611 
27 While vice will involve a failure in motivation towards the good, it may be possible to have a motivation that 
is insufficient for virtue while not yet being flawed enough to class as a vice. This will be the case if we accept, 
as seems plausible, the existence of traits that are neither virtuous nor vicious. 
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Moody-Adams argues, our reluctance to blame in cases of moral ignorance may be based on a 
poor account of what blame is.28 On her view we are in the grip of a false dichotomy: we see 
blame as either harsh and retributive or overly therapeutic, as when we explain bad behaviour by 
attributing a ‘syndrome’, such as sex addiction. There are lots of different ways to think of blame 
and blameworthiness, and we remain as neutral as possible on those questions here. What we are 
not neutral on is just that some sort of blame is appropriate, and that blame is properly blame, 
not merely negative assessment. Blame is appropriate in cases of vice because the agent has a 
flawed will. 
 
3. VICE AND CULTURAL IGNORANCE 
The question then, is whether agents in cases of widespread cultural ignorance can be said to 
have become ignorant through vice. Let’s distinguish three different sorts of situation where an 
agent is ignorant. In the first sort of situation, there is no available evidence at all. It is easy to 
think of cases of non-moral ignorance that look like this – there is no evidence available to us 
about many non-normative matters, and so there is no reason at all to suppose that our 
ignorance is caused by vice.29 Of course, this doesn’t show that we don’t have such vices – our 
ignorance may be over determined. The point is just that a case with no available evidence is not 
an interesting case to discuss here: it will be very unclear whether vice is the primary cause of 
ignorance. 
 
The second category of case where agents are ignorant is one in which they are ignorant despite 
there being plenty of evidence. In this case, there are various possibilities. One is that the agent is 
severely cognitively limited, and thus their ignorance is not reflective of bad motivations. 
Another possibility is that this particular agent, through bizarre circumstances, is not in a 
position to see the evidence, so in fact the evidence (though available in the sense that it is 
available to most agents) is not in fact available to this agent (e.g. she is locked in a room). 
Another possibility is that the agent is ignorant through a previous act of clear eyed akrasia. 
Finally, the possibility we are interested in is that the agent is ignorant through vice. As we 
argued above, there are two ways that an agent might be ignorant through vice: through a purely 
epistemic vice, and through a moral-epistemic vice.  
 
FitzPatrick’s example of George W. Bush’s policy making (discussed above) is paradigmatic of 
moral-epistemic vice in action. This is clearly an example of an environment in which there was 
plenty of evidence available. It is precisely because the evidence is so clearly available that we can 
be confident in attributing vice in this case. The vice is a moral-epistemic vice because Bush’s 
motivations are problematic: if he had been more motivated by kindness and justice he would 
have been less concerned with loyalty and more concerned with expertise. Bush’s ignorance is 
affected, or motivated, in one of the clearly culpable senses discussed above. 
 
So that leaves a third sort of case, cases where there is evidence, but it is scant, or obscured 
by cultural factors. In such cases, it is much less plausible that ignorance is motivated. 
                                                          
28 See Moody Adams (1994 and 1997). 
29 It is a bit more controversial to imagine cases of moral ignorance where there is no evidence at all – perhaps 
the evidence for moral facts is always available – it depends on our account of moral reality. But we don’t need 
to worry about that issue here. In the cases we are interested in there is at least some evidence. 
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There is wide though tacit agreement in the literature that cases of cultural moral ignorance 
fall into this category.30 What should we say about moral ignorance in these cases? The 
standard view is that ignorance in these cases is not culpable. But the argument is not that 
there is no evidence. In fact, it is not entirely clear how the argument is supposed to work. 
The worry is something along the lines of, ‘it would not be reasonable to expect a normal 
agent to grasp the correct view’, ‘it would take someone exceptional to see the truth’, or ‘it 
would be too difficult to see the evidence’. We might understand these vague thoughts in 
two different ways: first, there is a thought that the mere fact that everyone else is making 
the same mistake exonerates me. Second, is a rather different thought: the fact that 
everyone makes this mistake shows that there is some underlying factor that is exculpatory. 
The underlying factor must be something like difficulty. The thought might be that when 
evidence is obscure, it would be very difficult to see the truth, and so we cannot be blamed 
for our mistake. Or, to put it another way, only a moral hero would see the truth in these 
situations. 
 
Let us take these in turn. First, is there some sort of conceptual connection between what 
most people do, or what the average agent does, and what is blameworthy? The argument 
against blameworthiness in cases of cultural ignorance is often put in terms of what it 
would be reasonable to expect. But there are two ways to understand reasonable 
expectation: normatively and statistically. If we are using the normative sense of 
‘reasonable’, then of course there is a conceptual connection between blameworthiness and 
what it would be reasonable to expect. But that leaves open whether or not the average 
person will, as a matter of fact, behave in that way. On the other hand, if we claim that we 
should tie the normative sense of blameworthiness to the statistical sense of 
reasonableness, then that is a substantive issue. It is certainly not obvious that we should 
use the concepts that way. 
 
There are no good reasons to think that blameworthiness must be distributed on a curve. It 
is possible that we might all have certain moral or moral-epistemic vices. Indeed, this is one 
of the lessons from Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice. Fricker points out that the changing nature 
of prejudice in society means that we are all likely to be testimonially unjust with regard to 
at least some widespread prejudices.31 Similarly, in ‘Environmental Virtue Ethics’, Rosalind 
Hursthouse proposes a “new” virtue of “respect for nature”, and points out that “none of 
us” really possess this virtue.32 In fact, it is plausible that the majority of people not only 
lack the virtue, but actually possess the corresponding vice. Examples like this suggest that 
there is no conceptual barrier to there being virtues that the majority of people lack, or 
vices that the majority of people possess.33 
                                                          
30 See Moody-Adams (1994 and 1997) and Calhoun (1989). Rosen says it would take a moral genius (2003, 
p.66). FitzPatrick (2008) talks about how difficult it would be to see the truth in these situations.  
31 However, as we will discuss, Fricker does not believe that this injustice is necessarily blameworthy. On what 
the failing amounts to, see (for example) Fricker (2007) pp. 89-91. On the point that all of us are likely to be 
unjust regarding at least some prejudices, see pp. 97-98. It is worth pointing out that in unjust societies, 
referring to ‘what everyone thinks’ often means just what the dominant group thinks. See Charles Mills (1997) 
and subsequent works for discussion of white privilege as it relates to epistemology.  
32 See Hursthouse (2007) esp. p. 167 
33 For a recent discussion of how widespread moral virtue and vice possession might be, see Miller (2014). 
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Compare arguments about demandingness in normative theory. Utilitarianism is often 
accused of being too demanding a theory. What this complaint means is not clear, but one 
possibility is that the worry is that most people will not in fact do what utilitarianism tells 
them to do. It is an open question whether that succeeds as a criticism. It is open to 
utilitarians to reply that it remains the case that people should act in a more altruistic way, 
even if they, in fact, do not and will not. Again, we do not have to say that people are moral 
heroes simply because they are in the minority in acting well. 
 
So the fact that most agents do not respond to the evidence in a given situation is not itself 
reason to think that they must be blameless. It is conceptually possible that a large majority 
of agents are blameworthy. This is true regardless of whether we think in terms of atomic 
fault or vice. It is possible that the vast majority of wealthy agents fail in their obligations to 
those in poverty. Equally, it is possible that the vast majority of agents in some particular 
social group are in the grip of a moral (or moral-epistemic) vice.  
 
So much for the suggestion that there is a necessary connection between what average agents are 
like and what is blameworthy. The other thought in the neighbourhood is that if seeing the truth 
would be very difficult, then it cannot be blameworthy not to see it. This seems to be Miranda 
Fricker’s view. Her view is subtle: she argues for responsibility but not blameworthiness in cases 
of cultural ignorance. She is discussing an example in which a character in a movie, Herbert 
Greenleaf, fails to take seriously the testimony of a female character. She says: 
 
If we judge Greenleaf in the light of the full ethical resources of his day, then while 
we may find that the epistemic injustice he does Marge is not culpable (he judged 
routinely), we may still see it as less than it might have been (less than exceptional)… 
The distinction between exceptional and routine moral judgement, then, points to the 
possibility of a more nuanced range of moral attitudes to historically and culturally 
distant others; regardless of whether one holds to the internal or the external 
interpretation of reasons; for it allows us to avoid the hubris of deeming them 
blameworthy for actions not routinely regarded as wrong in their culture, while still 
holding them morally responsible to this or that extent, depending on how nearly 
available the exceptional moral move is judged to have been.34 
 
On Fricker’s view it would have taken something exceptional for Greenleaf to see Marge as 
a reliable source, and we cannot reasonably expect people to behave in exceptional ways. So 
although people like Greenleaf are responsible for their actions, they are not blameworthy. 
Again, the point here cannot just be that as a matter of statistical fact most people don’t 
transcend their culture so therefore it is not blameworthy. Rather, the thought must be that 
there is an underlying factor that explains why most people don’t transcend their culture, 
and that underlying factor is exculpatory. 
 
FitzPatrick shares the general reluctance to think of ignorant agents in situations of cultural 
ignorance as blameworthy. FitzPatrick’s argument is chiefly intended to undermine the strong 
                                                          
34 Fricker (2007) p.105 
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voluntarist claim made by Zimmerman and Rosen, that a previous act of clear-eyed akrasia is 
required to render ignorance culpable.35 FitzPatrick argues that much normative ignorance results 
from vices such as overconfidence, arrogance, dismissiveness, laziness, dogmatism, incuriosity, 
self-indulgence, and contempt. These are all plausibly moral-epistemic vices in our sense, and 
thus blameworthy, although they may not involve clear-eyed akrasia. 
 
However, FitzPatrick’s main focus is on cases where a vice is exercised ‘voluntarily’.36 In 
cases of cultural ignorance, according to FitzPatrick, vice is not exercised voluntarily. It is 
not entirely clear what that means: FitzPatrick says various things about why agents in cases 
of cultural ignorance might not be blameworthy, but he does not seem to imagine that 
there is no evidence at all. He uses the language of reasonable expectation – he does not 
think it would be reasonable to expect people to see through their culture’s orthodoxy. At 
least part of FitzPatrick’s worry is that it would be very difficult for agents to see the truth.37 
 
Does difficulty exculpate? In contrast to impossibility (which certainly exculpates), we have 
a conceptually open question here – there is nothing built into our concept of 
blameworthiness to say that we cannot be blamed if it would have been difficult to do the 
right thing. One might think that difficulty mitigates blameworthiness, and one might not.38 
If one’s entire culture is producing evidence and testimony that (for example) women are 
essentially different and somewhat inferior to men, surely that is what it is rational to 
believe?39  One could think harder and form the view that the evidence is circularly produced 
and the testimony is due to ideological forces, but this is a lot to ask, too much for normal 
agents. If a bad moral practice is epistemically justified, a natural line of thought goes, it 
must be morally excusable.  
 
Whatever we think about difficulty in general, we should agree that there is something odd 
about appealing to difficulty as an exculpatory factor when it is obvious that there is a vice 
operating. Let’s take George Bush again. In what sense would it have been difficult for him 
to see the truth? There is an internal barrier, his vice, and so although it is true that it would 
have been difficult, it is not at all clear that that is exculpatory. In fact, the thing that makes 
it difficult for him to see the truth is the very same thing that makes him blameworthy for 
not seeing the truth.40 In the case where there is cultural ignorance, the idea is that the 
barrier is external, not internal, and so not connected to the will of the agent. But 
remember that we are considering a case where there is some evidence – where some people 
do see the truth. So the difference between the ones who do and the ones who do not is 
not simply an external difference. Rather, the difference could be that the ones who do see 
                                                          
35 For references to Rosen and Zimmerman (and related literature) see footnote 2. 
36 See FitzPatrick (2008) p.605. FitzPatrick’s reliance on voluntariness seems problematic here – see Levy 
(2009); Talbert (2013) and Mason (2015). 
37 See p.600 note 24 on the difficulty FitzPatrick imagines Aristotle would have had in seeing the wrongness of 
slavery. 
38 See chapters in this volume by Guerrero and Bradford. 
39 Cheshire Calhoun takes this view in her discussion of cultural ignorance (Calhoun 1989), and Calhoun 
thinks that although blame is not warranted, reproach is. Arpaly allows that this is a possibility, and that if the 
evidence is genuinely misleading there is no blameworthiness (2003, p.104). 
40 Talbert (2013) makes this point too. Hursthouse (1999, Chapter 4) discusses the issue of internal barriers in 
her discussion of Kant and Aristotle on moral motivation. 
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the truth are differently motivated than the ones who do not. We need to think carefully 
about the relationship between the agents we are considering, and their evidence.  
 
The evidence in cases of cultural ignorance is very complex. Ideology functions to reinforce false 
beliefs and obscure more useful ways of thinking about situations. Is the fact that there are so 
few women in philosophy evidence that women are fundamentally ill-suited to philosophy? Or is 
it evidence that they have been and are systematically discriminated against? There is still 
disagreement about this, and intelligent people on both sides take themselves to be doing their 
very best with respect to the evidence. This reflection leads to a further point: evidence in these 
cases is not something we just ‘have’. It is something we have to interpret. We may lack the tools 
to do this, tools we would only have reached through exposure to feminist theory. As Calhoun 
puts it: 
 
Such neologisms as “sexual harassment” and “date rape” facilitate both our seeing moral 
issues where we had not previously and our drawing connections between these and 
already acknowledged moral issues (e.g., between rape by strangers and date rape). But 
feminists also reshape moral language in less readily accessible ways – “marginalize,” “the 
Other,” “silencing,” “rapist society,” “marriage as prostitution.”41 
 
We might take this (as Calhoun does) as reason to think that, epistemically, there is no 
blameworthiness here. But this is not simply an epistemic issue. What is at stake in this sort of 
case is of moral value. The aim that guides whether or not you should seek more information is 
not itself an epistemic aim. Imagine that I must decide on a policy for my business to follow with 
respect to palm oil use. If I am only concerned to make as much money as possible, I have no 
need to find out about animal welfare issues. If, on the other hand, I am concerned to be moral, 
I should find out more about palm oil, and orang-utan habitat. There can be no purely epistemic 
reason to seek more information. We should, as Richard Feldman argues, take the notion of 
epistemic justification to concern only the relationship between actual possessed evidence and 
belief.  As Feldman says, there may be further reasons to look for more evidence, but they are 
not epistemic reasons.42 The same applies to interpretation of our evidence. 
 
Thus so long as there is some evidence for the falsity of the dominant moral view in situations of 
cultural ignorance, (and there usually is), the question of the morally relevant motivations of the 
ignorant agents arises. And the acknowledged fact that it would be difficult to see through the 
dominant moral view does not settle any issues of epistemic or moral blameworthiness. The 
question is, ‘what explains the persistence of ignorance?’. Crucially, ‘is the persistence of 
ignorance explained through flawed motivations concerning the moral good?’. 
 
We have now argued that the fact that ignorance is widespread does not settle the issue of 
whether such ignorance is culpable. What matters is whether the ignorance is caused or sustained 
by the presence of a flawed will. There is nothing in the concept of vice that rules out the 
possibility that vice possession may also be widespread. It is important to now consider whether 
                                                          
41 Calhoun (1989), p. 397 
42 Feldman, 1998, p.250-252 
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there might actually be examples of widely held moral-epistemic vices that can explain cases of 
cultural ignorance, and what those vices might look like. 
 
At one point, Moody-Adams says that the most common sort of affected ignorance stems from 
a common human fault: our tendency to avoid acknowledging that we are fallible, and that even 
our most deeply held convictions might be wrong.43 On the terminology set out above, this 
tendency will be a contender for a moral-epistemic vice. Having a motivation for truth that is 
overridden by a competing (even if unconscious) desire to view oneself as infallible is one way of 
lacking a sufficiently robust motivation to the epistemic good. And in cases where the truths in 
question are of moral significance, an agent’s tendency to be motivated by this competing desire 
may also reveal a flawed motivation to the moral good. The motivational tendency highlighted 
by Moody-Adams may then come out as a potentially widespread moral-epistemic vice. And we 
might include this trait in a loosely defined group of vices that involve a motivation to self-
aggrandizement.44   
 
Consider another possible example of a widespread moral-epistemic vice. In the virtue ethics 
tradition, it is accepted that one way in which an agent can be led astray is by a competing desire 
for bodily pleasures. When this competing desire overrides an agent’s motivation towards well-
being or fairness, then that agent will possess the vice of intemperance, and will possess it as a moral 
vice. It is also possible that the agent’s desire for bodily pleasures will override their motivation 
for truth or knowledge. Drinking too much at a conference dinner such that you are unable to 
attend the talks the following day may well provide evidence of intemperance possessed as an 
epistemic vice. And if we think that attendance is somehow demanded by considerations of 
fairness or well-being then the intemperance in question may in fact be a moral-epistemic vice. 
Intemperance – understood as a tendency for one’s admirable motivations to be overridden by 
the competing motivation for bodily pleasures – can therefore be added to our list of moral-
epistemic vices that may well be widespread. 
 
Clearly, we also sometimes allow other sorts of pleasure to overtake us, and this is particularly 
relevant in the context of cultural ignorance. There are non-bodily pleasures that seduce us into 
epistemic laziness. We don’t have a well-developed vocabulary for talking about these pleasures, 
but we are familiar with the idea. For example, we talk about new experiences, both physical and 
intellectual, as pushing us out of our ‘comfort zone’. The implicit idea is that our existing, 
familiar, beliefs are ‘comfortable’. This is not bodily comfort, but a sort of intellectual comfort. 
Evidence resistance can often be explained by the competing motivation of ‘staying comfortable’ 
in this sense. Again, loosely, we might think of a family of vices involving a motivation to 
comfort in this sense. We could call these vices of laziness.45 
 
                                                          
43 Moody-Adams (1994) p.301 
44 Along similar lines, Medina (2013) characterises several vices that that involve motivations of this sort – 
including vices of arrogance – which will be more common among oppressor groups in hierarchical societies. 
For more on the difference between the epistemic perspective of the oppressor and the oppressed, see Mills 
(1997). 
45 Again, see Medina (2013) for a discussion of vices of this sort. 
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Various examples of such vices come up in Elizabeth Anderson’s recent discussion of socially 
hierarchical societies and different perspectives on social change.46 One case in particular 
provides a good example of the moral-epistemic vice of laziness. Anderson refers to research in 
psychology showing that people tend to attribute the (bad) behaviour of others to innate 
dispositions and not to circumstances. One might think that this is a merely cognitive bias, like a 
tendency to make faulty probability estimates. But like many cognitive biases, it is easy to see that 
the underlying motivation is practical, and morally relevant. If I believe that your criminality is 
innate, then there is nothing I can do about it, and so that is a much more comfortable belief 
than the alternative, which is to believe that your criminality is down to the inegalitarian society 
that I am largely a beneficiary of. Many of our ‘cognitive’ errors about the way the world works 
can be understood as vices of laziness – that is, a tendency to allow our motivation towards 
intellectual comfort to override our motivations to truth and justice.47 Well known biases such as 
the just world bias and the control bias can be understood as moral-epistemic vices in the 
laziness family. They are not purely cognitive: our motivations towards comfort override our 
motivations to truth and justice.  
 
Another vice in this family involves a motivation to conformity. There is a sort of comfort in 
having the same views and outlook as those whom we take to be our peers, and we tend to seek 
conformity with others even at the expense of other, more important values. Of course, this is 
controversial. Many epistemologists think that trust in others is an epistemic virtue, and that is 
surely right up to a point. The idea here is that it often goes too far.  Stanley Milgram’s 
experiments (another controversial example, of course) seem to show that so long as the subject 
is being told what to do by the experimenter, they will administer powerful electric shocks to 
someone that they believe is suffering considerably (in fact the person being ‘shocked’ is a 
confederate of the experimenter). That seems to show that we take what we think of as ‘norms’ 
in a situation very seriously – thinking we are in line with ‘everyone else’ has a huge effect on 
what we are willing to do. When other subjects (also confederates) refused to obey the 
experimenter, there was a huge drop in obedience.48 Another example is meat eating. Vegetarian 
campaigners often appeal to the critical mass effect of moral progress, trying to get meat eaters 
to see that if it wasn’t for the fact that so many other people also eat meat, they would probably 
find it appalling. In other words, the campaigners are trying to get people to see that they are 
more motivated by conformity than by evidence or morality.  
 
As we said in analysing virtue, for a trait to be a virtue it must involve a motivation that is 
persistent, strongly felt and robust. The candidates for the sorts of moral-epistemic vice that 
plausibly underwrite moral ignorance in situations of cultural ignorance are all failures of 
robustness – cases where there is a competing motivation. And it seems to us that these are the 
most common sorts of case, cases where competing motivations towards self-aggrandizement 
(vices of arrogance), or towards comfort (vices of laziness) pull the agent in the wrong direction. 
But it may sometimes be the case that failing to examine the evidence carefully is not caused by a 
                                                          
46 Anderson 2016. 
47 Whereas the oppressed seem less likely to suffer from vices of arrogance, they do seem susceptible to vices 
of laziness. False consciousness, the tendency to internalize the oppressor’s narrative, can be caused by vices of 
laziness. However, there are, of course asymmetries between the situation of the oppressor and the oppressed 
that will be relevant to how we think of blameworthiness. 
48 Milgram 1974 
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pull towards a competing motivation, but rather is just a sort of indifference, or apathy. These 
further cases would also count as instances of vice on our view. They exhibit a flawed motivation 
towards the good through failing to be sufficiently strongly felt. If the ignorance in situations of 
cultural ignorance implicates the presence of widespread moral-epistemic vices such as these, 
then that ignorance ought to be viewed as culpable. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Many have assumed that widespread cultural ignorance exculpates those who are involved in 
otherwise morally problematic practices, such as the ancient slaveholders, 1950s sexists or 
contemporary meat eaters. In this paper we have sought to put pressure on that assumption. 
Firstly, we have contributed to the understanding of culpable ignorance in terms of vice 
possession by setting out a version of the personal worth conception of virtue and vice. Having a 
clearer account of the nature of virtue and vice, and of the connections between moral, epistemic 
and moral-epistemic vices, ought to help further the debate on this issue. Secondly, we have 
applied this understanding of virtue and vice to cases involving cultural ignorance. Given that 
there is no conceptual barrier to the widespread possession of vice, it becomes an open question 
whether or not cases of widespread cultural ignorance are culpable. We have attempted to 
support the idea that such ignorance may well be culpable by highlighting two clusters of moral-
epistemic vice – vices of arrogance and vices of laziness – which may well be widespread. If the 
ignorance in cases of cultural ignorance is caused or sustained by the possession of moral-
epistemic vices such as these, then that ignorance ought to be viewed as culpable, regardless of 
how widespread it happens to be. 
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